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Complicating the Concept of Culture
This essay argues against a simple, reified view of culture as a set of 
ideas and norms belonging to a group or nation and considers 
implications of a more complicated concept for discussion of world 
culture and the global/local nexus. Most anthropologists define culture 
as the making of meaning, with an emphasis on the process itself as 
contested. It follows that world culture is locally produced in social 
interaction, and that meaning are then re-constructed in the global/local
nexus. Power matters, particularly the hidden power to make resources 
for meaning making widely available, and to make them attractive and 
scientifically persuasive. How actors succeed in claiming particular ideas
as global and how the locals strategically respond are questions where 
anthropologists can contribute to understanding the global/local nexus 
and the exercise of power within the world polity. 
Keywords: culture, world culture theory, sociology’s institutionalism, 
global/local nexus, anthropology, cultural meaning, globalization
Introduction 
Both world culture theorists and their interlocutors make frequent reference 
to the concept of culture—specifically to “world culture” or “global culture” 
on the one hand (e.g. Lechner and Boli 2005), and to “national culture” on 
the other (e.g., Schriewer 2004). But what does “culture” mean? 
Anthropologists, for whom the culture concept is central, used to define 
culture as the property of a group, that is, the beliefs and patterns of 
behaviour typical of a particular society (Baldwin et al. 2006). However, in 
recent decades anthropologists have moved away from that simple 
definition. Moreover, the majority of anthropologist write about culture at the
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local level, raising the question of what a concept as sweeping as “world 
culture” or even as “national culture” might mean. Meanwhile, the general 
population has embraced anthropology’s traditional, over-simple definition of
culture, readily using it to stereotype and exoticise other people and even to 
mask talk about race—to the point that some anthropologists seek to 
abandon the term “culture” altogether (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1991; González 
1999). 
 In this context, I seek to complicate the concept of culture as used 
within comparative education and to ask how a more complicated, nuanced 
concept might operate in discussions of world culture and the local-global 
nexus. The first section of this essay will note that many anthropologists 
today define culture as the making of meaning, often with an emphasis on 
the process and with attention to the contest over meaning between more 
and less powerful actors. The second section will consider the ways in which 
power matters to the construction and diffusion of ideas around the globe. 
My illustrations will come primarily from Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s 
anthropological study of logging and environmentalism in Borneo, Frictions 
(2005), an analysis that has inspired anthropologists who study educational 
reform across multiple “levels” (Vavrus and Bartlett 2009), and from my 
work with Ntal Alimasi on the flow of educational reforms into and through 
the Republic of Guinea (Anderson-Levitt and Alimasi 2001).
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Before beginning, however, I take a short detour to consider what 
“local” and “global” mean and to offer a few other caveats.
What counts as local or global?
What counts as global and especially what counts as local are rarely spelled 
out (Moore 2004). To begin, there are many localities or “scales,” not just 
two. In Frictions (2005), Tsing reports from the various perspectives of 
settlements in the Meratus Mountains, of a provincial university and its 
nature-loving students, of the nation as represented by Indonesian-based 
logging companies, and of global organizations as represented in Jakarta and
at a conference in the United States. Local and global are thus two ends of a 
more complex continuum (compare Napier 2003), and what counts as local 
depends on the contrast of interest. In some critiques of world culture 
theory, it is national culture that is portrayed as the opposite of the global; 
for example, Schriewer, in the proposal for this volume, uses “local agency” 
to refer to a to “a group or nation.” On the other hand, although 
anthropologists occasionally write about national cultures, we more often 
focus on villages, towns, urban neighbourhoods, or other small-scale settings
—even face-to-face settings like schools and classrooms. 
In line with the anthropological focus, I propose to define the “local” as
particular people who have the possibility of interacting regularly in 
particular places (including electronic sites). By that definition, an academic 
department is local but the Comparative and International Education Society 
is not, since its members meet only about once a year. The White House is 
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local, but the entire US government is not, nor is the United States as a 
nation. The World Bank conceived as the people who regularly interact at its 
building on H Street in Washington is local, but the World Bank conceived as 
people in all of its offices around the world and their interconnections with 
the UN, national governments, and NGOs is not. 
Whatever counts as global, it is at the opposite end of the continuum 
from the local. A commonsense meaning of global would be ideas or norms 
that are widespread across the world, even universal. A more complex 
meaning, as I will point out below, would be ideas or norms that people 
successfully present as widespread across the world, whether they truly are 
or not. Following Tsing, a third meaning of the “global” involves travelling 
and translation (2005: 213ff). She describes, for instance, how provincial 
Indonesian activists brought stories about the activist Chico Mendes to 
mountain settlements in Borneo from Brazil, by way of North America and 
Malaysia. In this sense, the global refers to the movement of people or ideas 
or things, which travel from one local-ity to another and require translation in
the new setting. Because of their travelling, they may indeed be widespread 
(meaning 1); they may also be claimed as widespread or universal (meaning 
2) even if they are not really so widely shared.
It is important to remember that in any particular setting there may a 
hazy borderland rather than a sharp distinction between the global (in the 
sense of what comes from elsewhere) and the local (in the sense of 
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indigenous). People or ideas may fall in both categories simultaneously. In 
our study of the flow of educational reforms into and through Guinea in the 
1990s, for example, we found that many people had one foot in the local 
(whether the Ministry of Education or a village school) and one foot in the 
global (whether experience at an international NGO or time spent at a French
university), while many educational ideas could likewise be seen as both 
foreign and indigenous (Anderson-Levitt and Alimasi 2001).
Other caveats
Three other caveats. First, since culture and power are complex and 
contentious topics, I write as one US anthropologist without claiming to 
represent the entire discipline. Second, the culture concept is an analyst’s 
abstraction for describing and explaining complex human behaviours, even 
though the experiences we describe as “cultural” are very real, as anyone 
who has experience culture shock can attest. The third caveat is that 
writings by dozens of world culture theorists and their interlocutors fill 
thousands of pages and do not, of course, manifest perfect consistency. Thus
it is possible to find world culture theorists or their allies recognizing many of
the points I make at least somewhere in the corpus, if not always in the core 
of their arguments. What I attempt to do here is to correct a few tendencies 
that seem misguided from an anthropologist’s point of view, to emphasize 
and encourage other tendencies, and to consider what kind of 
anthropological work would contribute to the discussion.
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Culture as meaning-making
Definitions of culture have continued to evolve since Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
published about 200 of them in 1952; Baldwin et al. (2006) recently listed 
300 more. In spite of the diversity of perspectives, most scholars agree on 
one point, namely, that culture is the opposite of the natural, “instinctual” or 
innate. 
Beyond that, since the cognitive turn of the 1950s and 1960s, many 
anthropologists have described culture as the making of meaning—meaning 
being beliefs and norms, understandings and know-how, or “knowledge” 
very broadly defined (e.g., Anderson-Levitt 2002, Fischer 2007, Strauss and 
Quinn 1998), that is,”the whole of the social processes of signification” 
(García Canclini 2006: 121). Today anthropologists rarely include behaviour 
per se in definitions of culture; we are still interested in “patterning in human
activity” (Erickson 2011:25), but the word patterning points to assumptions 
and expectations, often tacit, that guide behavior and identify what is 
surprising rather than to the whole of behaviour per se. Thus meaning 
making refers not only to the act of interpreting what is going on, but also to 
the know-how and norms required to behave like a sensible person. In this 
double sense, culture is “acquired knowledge people use to interpret 
experience and generate behavior” (Spradley 1979: 5).
When writing about meaning making, some anthropologists emphasize
the meanings, describing culture as a cognitive system or a body of 
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knowledge, as ideas and propositions (e.g., Goodenough 1981, D’Andrade 
1995; Strauss and Quinn 1998), or a system of symbols (e.g., Geertz 1973). 
World culture theorists use the same kind of language when they refer to 
scripts (e.g., Ramirez 2003), blueprints (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000), or 
models (e.g., Meyer, Kamens and Benavot 1992), or when they define 
culture as “socially shared symbolic and meaning systems that become 
embedded in objects, organizations, and people” (Lechner and Boli 2005: 
16).
However, since the 1980s many anthropologists have shifted the focus 
to practice or performance and hence emphasize the process of making 
meaning over the meanings themselves. For example, Brian Street defines 
culture as “an active process of meaning making and contest over definition,
including its own definition” (Street 1993: 25; emphasis added). This shift 
represented part of the general movement in the social sciences to 
recognize the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
However, the shift also happened as a reaction against the exoticising and 
even racialising, mentioned above, of a static concept of culture. Thus some 
anthropologists have proposed treating “culture” as a verb (Street 1993, 
Wax 1993), while others propose the adjective “cultural” to allow for a more 
fluid, less reifying discussion (e.g., Appadurai 1997). Focusing on meaning 
making as a process also makes it easier to consider the operation of power.
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Defining culture as meaning making, particularly when focusing on 
practice and process, has many implications for writing about culture in 
general and about world culture and its connections to local culture in 
particular. I will explore them in the rest of this section.
 Culture does not act
Any definition of culture as meaning making, whether focused on the 
meanings or on how they are made, implies that culture does not act. 
Culture does not do things to people; rather, people do things, and one 
important thing they do is make meaning. Recognizing that human beings 
are the actors and even naming individual actors (as does Bodley 2003 as 
well as Tsing 2005) brings clarity to the analysis and makes it easier to see 
how the global interacts with the local. 
In contrast, world culture theorists sometimes write as if culture has a 
life of its own and makes things happen. They write, for example, that 
“Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping 
the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local 
actors” (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997:145). However, Lechner and 
Boli acknowledge the tendency to write in this vein as “the specter of 
reification” and clarify that talking of world culture as doing things is merely 
a convenience, “sparing us the need to unpack it into its components or into 
the actions of people using the symbolic resources at their disposal” (2005: 
26). (Their metaphor of people using resources is apt, and I will return to it 
later.)
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If it does not reify, much of the literature on globalization relies heavily
on the passive voice and is vague about who does the acting. However, 
some texts do name the actors. For instance, in their essay “Development 
and Education” (2000), Chabbott and Ramirez identify development 
professionals and US economists as actors, as well as organizations like 
UNESCO, the Ford Foundation, comparative education journals, academic 
programs, and NGOs. Similarly, Ramirez (2003) refers to “the actors 
themselves—individuals, nation-states, organizations, professionals and 
other “modern” experts” (p. 242). Here, I take the claim that organizations 
or national governments are actor as another shorthand gloss for what 
actually happens, since organizations are complex collections of people co-
constructing meaning and sometimes struggling with one another over 
competing meanings.
Cultures have no one-to-one relationship with groups
Reflecting on culture as meaning making also leads to the conclusion that 
groups do not “own” particular cultures. Meanings are too frequently shared 
across group boundaries, on the one hand, while not everyone inside the 
group necessarily shares the same beliefs and norms, on the other 
(Goodenough 1981; compare Bateson 1958). Thus, contrary to the views of 
anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and to notions among the general public, 
anthropologists today do not imagine a one-to-one correspondence between 
a collection of beliefs and norms and an identifiable group of people. We 
avoid defining culture as the beliefs and patterns of behaviour of a particular
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society, and we no longer conceive of cultures as “complex wholes” or 
“configurations” (Erickson 2011). Today we recognized that “cultures are not
bounded and separable” (Strauss and Quinn 1998: 7). 
From the point of view of the individual, then, “we are all multicultural”
(Goodenough 1976), with “each person a junction point for an infinite 
number of partially overlapping cultures” (Strauss and Quinn1997: 7). From 
the perspective of the world’s population, it does not make sense to classify 
the world into distinct national or regional or even local cultures; rather, 
some anthropologists propose that we envision the world as a single 
ecumene, in which cultural meanings are shared across networks that may 
be local but that often span the globe (Foster 1991; Hannerz 2008; Wax 
1993). In this sense, any locally generated cultural idea or norm, from a 
dance craze or pop song to a particular way of teaching reading or a passion 
for democracy, has the potential to spread around the world. All culture is 
potentially global.
In any discussion of “world culture,” then, exactly who participates in 
or uses the culture so named is an open question. The notion of “national 
culture” or any other named culture must likewise be unpacked. For 
example, when Jürgen Schriewer writes about the “nation-specific discourse 
developments … determined by cultural, religious, political and ideological 
forces and traditions intrinsic to each society under study” (2004: 527), he 
makes it clear that in the case at hand, he is not referring to his target 
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nations of Spain, China and Russia in general, but rather specifically to 
“educational knowledge as documented in scholarly education journals” 
published in each nation (2004: 493). It would be interesting to investigate 
further who the journal editors, review boards, or other participants were. 
Groups sometimes claim to own culture
But why, one might ask, if culture has no natural borders, is it so easy to 
speak of national cultures or ethnic cultures as distinct bodies of beliefs and 
norms? The explanation is that people often engage in meaning making 
deliberately and strategically, and one reason they do so is to create distinct 
group identities (e.g., Moerman 1965). There is a great deal of work done to 
construct “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983) by claiming ideas and 
values and ways of doing things as one’s own; for example, many Americans
insist that baseball is an American sport in spite of its importance in the 
Dominican Republic, Japan, Korea and other parts of the world (Sharrock 
1974). Thus cultural differences are at least partly about the construction of 
group identity (Barth 1969), and the concept of a national culture is itself a 
cultural product (cf. Foster 1991). 
It follows that what counts as world culture is not necessarily shared by
all or even many people in the world, but is rather whatever is successfully 
claimed as world culture by those people who manage to have a say in the 
matter. As Lechner and Boli explain:
“To say that a cultural element is universalistic ... is to say that the 
element is presented to the world ‘as if’ it were universally meaningful, 
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applicable, useful, or proper. The element is presumed to have universal
(worldwide) scope; it is presumed to be interpretable in a largely 
uniform way and to make sense both cognitively and, often, 
normatively, in any particular local culture or social framework” (2005: 
21)
Unfortunately, the passive voice prevents them from specifying who is doing 
the presenting and the presuming, for it would be instructive to investigate 
who claims to speak for world culture and how they manage to put their 
claims across.
 All culture is locally made
If meaning is made in social interaction, it follows that all culture is locally 
produced by particular people who interact in particular places. As Erickson 
puts it, “the locus of culture as experience, as learned and enacted, is the 
local community of practice” (2011: 31-32). Even when they are alone, 
people doing interpretive work draw on and respond to resources generated 
by other people, and in doing so they are interacting with other people. The 
interaction may not always take place face-to-face; it may happen over the 
telephone or through email or texting, but if it is regular interaction I would 
nonetheless refer to it as local production of meaning.
If all culture is locally produced, then even world culture must be 
locally constructed in the sense that the ideas or norms are generated in 
some particular locality by people who have occasion to interact regularly. 
The question becomes, what are the locations where this happens? The 
ideas and norms that actors claim as world culture are constructed in such 
places as World Bank offices and university conference halls, in Ministry of 
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Education offices when aid officials meet with local decision-makers, and in 
classrooms where inspectors are introducing internationally sanctioned texts.
By the same token, national culture is constructed in a myriad of local 
interactions, from the halls of Congress or Parliament to a bar where people 
debate who belongs in this country to classrooms where children are taught 
national history. 
Global meaning making is also local in the sense that global actors 
(that is, people who claim to speak for the world or for universal standards) 
draw on resources from their own locations to make meaning. For example, 
in Guinea, visiting international reformers proposed recognizably US or 
recognizably French reforms for Guinean reading instruction depending on 
whether they came from Anglophone North America or from France 
(Anderson-Levitt and Alimasi 2001); their Western ideas were not a monolith.
Similarly, Tsing points to the “particularities” of global projects, giving an 
example regarding conflicting visions of the rain forest in Indonesia. Whereas
the people who live in the Meratus Mountains see the “trees as social 
networks” (2005: 256), both loggers and environmentalists from the West 
imagine the forest as a natural area in symbolic contrast with social spaces. 
This Western view, says Tsing, is drawn from historical European experiences
in which elites seized forests and drove peasants out of them, emptying 
them of the social (2005: 201).
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The global/local nexus likewise refers to the production of meaning in 
particular places—places of encounter between travelling actors or ideas and
local actors. In Frictions, Tsing shows how global projects like the 
international logging trade and also like environmental protection of the rain 
forest take place in interactions that engage people representing global 
concerns, people representing the nation, provincial actors, and people who 
live in the forests in question. Her word for interactions is “friction,” a 
metaphor that points to the resistance and obstacles encountered in such 
interactions, but also to the “grab” (friction as discussed in physics and 
engineering) that is necessary to make anything happen. Importantly, in her 
analysis of such encounters, she illustrates how a global movement like the 
arrival of international logging in Borneo’s rain forests was contingent on 
many factors and far from an inevitable event. 
Traces in artefacts are resources for further meaning making
If meaning is constructed in social interaction, however, how should we think
about the artefacts that researchers find so revealing, such as policy 
documents, special terminology, or the very structure of school systems? 
Certainly, meanings generated in social interactions leave traces in the form 
of artefacts, including language, texts, and institutions (Cole 1996; Wertsch 
1998). World culture theorists seem to agree; that is what I take Lechner and
Boli to mean when they write of culture as “embedded … in objects and 
organizations” (2005: 16). It is what Jürgen Schriewer means when he writes 
[in the proposal for this theme issue] of “meaning processing schemata” as 
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“rooted in … in collective experience crystallised into language and 
language-bound semantic corpuses.” From a constructivist perspective, 
these traces are not culture per se, but rather the effects of past cultural 
construction, which then serve as resources available for further meaning 
making. For example, an aid worker seeking to explain the difficulties faced 
in implementing universal primary education will find a wealth of pre-
established vocabulary and explanations published in documents by 
UNESCO, the World Bank, and UNDP, and mentioned by colleagues in the 
office and at conferences (cf. Schriewer and Harney 1999 on national 
resources). 
As resources, artefacts like a word, a text or an institutional 
arrangement do not carry fixed meanings, for people who encounter them 
for the first time have to interpret them, that is, to generate their meanings 
anew. Those who take in global ideas adapt them—”creolize” them, to use 
Hannerz’s term (1987). For example, the Indonesian activists who brought 
the story of Chico Mendes to settlements in Borneo modified the story to 
conform to Indonesian political realities, omitting Mendes’ central goal of 
unionizing the rubber tappers (Tsing 2005: 233). In our study of the import of
educational reforms into Guinea, Alimasi and I noted varying degrees of 
creolization. At one end of the continuum, Guinean decision-makers adopted 
some notions “as is,” without attempting to change them, although even in 
such cases transformations happened as the ideas were translated to 
provincial leaders and then to local leaders and finally to classrooms 
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(compare Napier 2003). At the opposite end of the continuum, there were 
cases where the Guineans adopted nothing more than the label for an idea 
to attach to their own concerns, giving a term like “rich texts” or a concept 
like “cultural relevance” a meaning quite different from the meanings 
intended by outside reformers (Anderson-Levitt and Alimasi 2001). 
Somewhere in the middle of this continuum lay what could properly be called
“creolized” ideas, borrowed ideas transformed to the point that they become
something new, albeit still recognizable. 
Power matters
Importantly, anthropologists do not assume that meanings are simply 
constructed and traded in a cultural free market. Rather, anthropologists and
other social theorists have been concerned with contest over meaning and 
“culture as hegemonic power relations” at least since Marx (Fischer 2007: 4-
5). Street’s definition of culture cited earlier refers to “contest over 
definition” (1993: 25), and it is a contest played out on uneven ground. As 
Karabel and Halsey put it, “There is, to be sure, considerable latitude 
available to those engaged in struggles over the ‘definition of the situation,’ 
but the question of whose definition will ultimately prevail is pre-eminently 
one of power” (1977: 543, emphasis in original). 
Regarding world culture, one question is how power matters when 
global ideas get constructed in the first place. What contests over meaning 
take place inside and also between global institutions? What are the 
processes (say, within the World Bank, within an education ministry, or in the
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editorial office of an academic journal) by which certain meanings and not 
others leave traces? 
Another question concerns the global/local nexus: How does power 
shape the diffusion of ideas around the world and contests over their re-
interpretation in local settings? Here, world culture theorists acknowledge 
that they downplay power, offering as a rationale the argument that 
dominant actors like the World Bank or the United States do not exercise 
power to impose world culture because many tenets of world culture, such 
as human rights for all, are actually not in their interest (Ramirez 2003). 
However, whether in their interest or not—and neither world cultural 
theorists nor constructivists presume that states are rational actors—nations 
and international organizations actually do exercise power both overtly and 
in hidden, subtler ways, as I will show in this section.
Visible power
Sometimes ideas are imposed outright. Actors engaged in delineating and 
promoting global culture are sometimes in a position to impose 
acquiescence—or at least the appearance of acquiescence—through 
economic or political clout. For example, Ramirez (2003) notes the effect of 
World Bank decisions on the ebb and flow of vocational education in Africa. 
Similarly, the World Banks and its allies have influenced whether primary 
education or secondary and university education receive greater attention 
over the decades.
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In the Republic of Guinea, it was a question of economic clout. Local 
high-level managers and experts judged that donors were willing to fund 
only projects that matched the donors’ needs or interests, and feared not 
getting the funds if they did not accept projects as defined by the donors. 
Here is how one decision-maker expressed it in an interview: 
Nous ne pouvons pas dire non à un projet, parce que nous sommes un 
pays pauvre. Quelque modeste que soit l’argent, nous lui trouvons une 
raison d’être. … Dire ‘non’ à un projet? Non, nous allons plutôt négocier.
Nous allons lui trouver une place qui sert à nos objectifs. … Mais il faut 
le faire avec tact, avec souplesse. Est-ce qu’il faut prendre un marteau 
et taper? No. C’est eux qui apportent leur argent. Alors, il faut les prier. 
We cannot say no to a project because we are a poor country. No matter
how small the amount, we find a raison d’être for it. … Say ‘no’ to a 
project? No, instead we will negotiate. We will find a place for it that 
serves our objectives. … But it must be done with tact, with flexibility. 
Must one pound it in with a hammer? No. They are the ones bringing 
their money. Consequently we have to make polite requests. (Anderson-
Levitt and Alimasi 2001). 
The workings of raw power were completely visible to this local decision-
maker.
Hegemony
Hegemony, in contrast, is power that is invisible, even to the people who 
benefit from it. It is the taking for granted of a particular social order, which 
serves some people’s interests more than others, as natural and legitimate. 
Anthropologists have always noticed the hold of received knowledge, and 
since the 1970s have found language to express this idea in Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony (Ortner 1984). Here I consider four ways in which 
hegemony operates, with implications for the reconstruction of global 
meanings in new local settings.
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Past influence
If culture does not act, as claimed earlier, then culture cannot make people 
do things. That said, it is fair to assume that traces left in the form of 
language or the form of whole institutions make it easier or more obvious for
people to construct certain meanings rather than others. Ideas “repeatedly 
taken up and reiteratively agreed upon, endorsed and legitimized in the 
framework of recurrent international conferences, inter-governmental 
coordination meetings or expert panels,” as Schriewer (2009) puts it in the 
context of world culture, come to be seen as inevitable, although the 
possibility of improvisation never disappears. At the risk of reifying the 
notion of culture, we sometimes write that the traces or meaning making 
tend to channel new instances of meaning making into certain well-worn 
grooves.
Thus actors who have been in a position to influence past meaning 
making and to shape past institutional practices, or whose allies or 
predecessors have been in that position, enjoy a great advantage in shaping 
future meaning making. We can ask, for example, who are and who have 
been the school superintendents or high status education professors or other
decision-makers and opinion leaders who have had a stronger hand than 
other people in shaping institutions.
Wide distribution of culture-making resources
Another form of hegemonic power is actors’ ability to make widely and 
readily available the terminology, reports and other texts, and ways of doing 
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things that fit their perspectives and suit their interests, so that other actors 
find it easy to use those resources when constructing local meanings. The 
tools and mechanisms for diffusing resources—web sites, publishing 
industries, university courses, research institutes and their reports, not to 
mention the conferences at which terminology gets repeated—are not 
evenly distributed across the world. Affluent nations and large international 
organizations have a huge advantage here.
 Cachet
A third form of hegemonic power comes from the desire identified by world 
culture theorists of states or other actors to “model” or “copy” a script or 
blueprint (Meyer et al. 1997), or even to “enact” an identity ( Ramirez 2003: 
252). Economic and political power matter in developing the kind of prestige 
and legitimacy that make ideas attractive to imitators. Alimasi and I noticed 
that in Guinea in the 1990s, Western science had prestige, and aligning 
oneself with it garnered a bit of that prestige; anything to do with the United 
States also had a certain cachet, to use Alimasi’s term for an aura of success
or modernity with which actors sought to identify (Anderson-Levitt and 
Alimasi 2001). The wealth that made development of university and research
complexes in affluent countries, and the wealth that contributed to the 
development of the United States’ image in the world (for instance, through 
the movie and music industries) generated the kind of prestige that made 
Western ideas attractive.
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Ideas brought to Guinea by French and US and Canadian reformers 
also carried weight because they could be presented as international 
standards. In other words, the local aid workers and consultants were in a 
position to speak on behalf of an imagined global culture, to present an idea 
“‘as if’ it were universally meaningful, applicable, useful, or proper,” to 
return to Lechner and Boli’s phrase (2005: 21). Like officials of affluent 
governments and members of prestigious think tanks, they had the kinds of 
credentials and held the kinds of positions that gave their counsel the status 
of global culture, and thus invited imitation.
Persuasiveness
Of course, an idea can attract imitators not only because its promoters have 
the right credentials, but also because the idea itself appears reasonable and
promising. Science can persuade not only because it carries prestige but 
because it is intellectually convincing. Some of the decision-makers we 
encountered in Guinea, for example, were genuinely convinced by the 
arguments of French linguists or by teaching methods they had witnessed 
when studying in the United States or Canada. “Research shows, Madame, 
that this method is best,” I was told. 
Even when an idea is indeed worthy on its own merits (assuming one 
can make such an objective assessment), it is important to ask about the 
scientific and educational structures that encourage people to see this idea 
as reasonable and good. Research actually produces contentious and 
sometimes contradictory results, always requiring interpretation, but seen 
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from a distance, the publications and conferences in France or Britain or the 
United States can appear to have identified “best practice.” Moreover, 
researchers working for UNESCO and the OECD and the World Bank can 
produce and publish un-juried studies, distributed in beautiful packages on 
the web, to further bolster particular ideas. 
The power to conduct research—or to claim and disseminate certain 
research results—is the most hidden but perhaps the most powerful of the 
means by which actors with economic and political power influence contests 
over meaning. Again, universities have a particular role, as future decision-
makers find their way to universities in the United States and Europe—
financed by grants from the French government, for example, or by Fulbright
scholarships from the United States—and in taking their degrees get exposed
to the massive research industry of the North. 
Strategies in response
In contests over meaning-making, actors at the importing end are hardly 
passive. They exercise a range of strategies and responses, some of which I 
have already illustrated. At one end of a continuum, it is possible to resist 
outright when economic or political power is being used to promote an idea. 
For example, Alimasi and I encountered a few Guineans who refused to 
accept an idea at all, whether for their own scientific reasons or out of 
resistance to donor power. The clearest evidence of strategic resistance, as 
Steiner-Khamsi illustrates in this volume, are reforms that disappear the 
moment the donors are gone. Another strategy, often used when outright 
22
resistance is desirable but impossible, is to “master” an idea without 
appropriating it, as Wertsch discusses with reference to Estonians who 
mastered Soviet history without making the Soviet perspective their own 
(1998). The Guinean elites who sought to maximize loans and grants from 
donors to patch together their own projects likewise mastered without 
appropriating; another strategy was to play one donor against another 
(Anderson-Levitt and Alimasi 2001). As Steiner-Khamsi and Quist (2000) 
illustrate, actors may also borrow from elsewhere to use the cachet of an 
external source to promote an idea that is contentious in their own society. 
Meanwhile, as already noted, some decision-makers seemed to accept 
certain ideas through strong identification with the Western teachers or 
collaborators who introduced them to the idea. Others far at the 
appropriation end of the continuum made the ideas their own out of 
intellectual conviction—conviction that might, of course, have been bolstered
by their opportunity to study at Western universities.
In short, when global ideas enter a local arena, meanings are re-made 
not only because local actors inevitably reinterpret ideas in the context of 
their own frameworks, but also because they may struggle against the 
meanings offered or imposed by global actors. To ignore the contest over 
meaning and the relative power of different plays is to miss a crucial part of 
the flow of ideas around the world.
 Conclusion
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I have argued here that in discussions of world culture and the global/local 
nexus, we should avoid a simple concept of culture as beliefs and patterns of
behaviour belonging to a nation or other group. Rather, I recommend a 
messier and more complicated notion of culture as the contested process of 
meaning making. This more complicated notion has implications for the way 
we think and write about world culture and about the global/local nexus.
Implications for world culture 
The notion of culture as contested meaning making implies that people, not 
faceless forces, create world culture and make globalization happen, and 
that what happens is contingent rather than inevitable. Neither world culture
nor national cultures are bounded, distinct units; who shares which ideas and
norms within their boundaries or across them is always open to question. 
What counts as world culture is not necessarily widespread; it can be defined
as whatever people successfully claim as world culture, and hence may be 
just one set of meanings among many others shared by a particular network 
of actors within the global ecumene. World culture is locally produced in 
social interaction in the sense that particular people construct it together in 
particular places, drawing on familiar resources from their own localities. The
construction of world culture is as contested as any other production of 
culture.
Implications for the global/local nexus
The global/local nexus refers to the interaction or “friction” of travelling ideas
with ideas held by local actors and, like the production of world culture, it 
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happens locally. When world culture travels, translation happens; people at 
the receiving end necessarily reconstruct meanings using resources at hand.
Power matters in the process by which world culture travels, sometimes 
directly but often indirectly. Actors with great political power or wealth may 
have influenced in the past what has become thinkable and unthinkable; 
they can make their preferred ideas and norms readily available in the 
present as resources for further meaning making; their ideas enjoy the 
cachet of the powerful and the modern; and their ideas may be sanctioned 
by the research and university complex that they support. When global ideas
enter a local arena, meanings are re-made not only because local actors 
inevitably reinterpret ideas in the context of their own frameworks, but also 
because they may resist or deliberately redefine meanings offered or 
imposed by global actors. 
None of my claims should be especially problematic for world culture 
theorists or anyone considering the possibility of global culture (to 
paraphrase Ramirez 2003: 249), as long as they remember that people are, 
ultimately, the actors, and that power matters. I am not necessarily 
disagreeing with world culture theorists—just trying to put a human face on 
their arguments and trying to move from grand abstractions to how things 
actually happen, how the work is done, how the sausage is made.
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Implications for research 
The notion of culture laid out here invites certain kinds of research which 
have not yet become commonplace in comparative education. There have 
been some studies of the translation of global ideas when they arrive in new 
localities, as in Anderson-Levitt (2003) and Vavrus and Bartlett (2009). 
However, it is less common to observe the interactions among global, 
national, provincial, and local actors on the spot as Tsing (2005) does. Even 
rarer is the attempt to observe the process by which global ideas are 
originally constructed and contested, although it is possible to carry out such
studies, as through participant-observation at international donor meetings 
(e.g., Anderson-Levitt and Alimasi 2001), through interviews with meeting 
participants who have hashed out national and international standards (e.g., 
Lamont 2009), and through historical studies of the development of donor 
policy (e.g., Jones 2007). There are particular roles for anthropologists in this 
work. More fieldwork inside the World Bank, inside development agencies, 
and inside universities and research institutes where received knowledge 
gets generated would provide everyone with better tools for noticing and 
questioning hegemony.
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